Hestead v. CNA Supply Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 38467 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
7-22-2011
Hestead v. CNA Supply Respondent's Brief Dckt.
38467
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Hestead v. CNA Supply Respondent's Brief Dckt. 38467" (2011). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 2900.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/2900
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
NICK HESTEAD 
vs. 
Plaintiff /Respondent 
Cross Appellant 
CNA SURETY dba WESTERN SURETY 
COMPANY 
Defendant/ Appellant 
Cross Respojndent 
Docket No 38467 
RESPONDENTS/CROSS 
APPELLANTS BRIEF 
RESPONDENTS/CROSS APPELLANTS BRIEF - NICK HESTEAD 
Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District 
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon 
Honorable Susan E. Wiebe, District Judge, Presiding 
John L. Gannon 
Attorney at Law 
216 West Jefferson Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent Nick 
Hestead 
Joshua S. Evett, ISB #5587 
Kristina J. Wilson, ISB #7962 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
251 E. Front Street, Suite 300 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 343-5454 
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant CNA 
Surety, dba Western Surety Company 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1 Nature of the Case 
2 Course of Proceedings 
3.Statement of Facts 
A. Nick Hestead bought a truck which was an undisclosed 
branded lemon from Best of the Best and obtained a 
judgment. 
B. Two auto auctions were given insufficient funds checks 
for vehicles Best of the Best purchased and made direct 
claims on the Western Surety bond. 
C. Nick Hestead made a claim on the Western Surety bond 
and complied with the procedure in Idaho Code 49-1610 
D. The Idaho Transportation Department takes no position 
with regard to the procedure for payment of auto dealer 
bond claims. 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
ARGUMENT 
l .Is Nick Hestead entitled to Attorneys Fees pursuant to 
Idaho Code 41-1839? 
2. Did the Trial Court commit error when it did not award the 
sales tax and interest paid the lender as a "loss or damage" 
under Idaho Code 49-1610? 
Page 
lll 
1 
1 
3 
3 
3 
5 
7 
8 
10 
10 
1. The Western Surety bond is a statutory bond and its actions 
must be in accord with the bond statutes. It cannot rewrite or 
revise Idaho law. 
10 
A. The judgment requirement is a result of a legislative 14 
decision based upon competing arguments and policies 
and legislatures around the country require judgments. 
B. Many states require a judgment against the auto 15 
dealer for a bond claim to be paid. 
C. Three jurisdictions have required compliance with 16 
an auto dealer bond claim procedure 
D. The Surety Bond is not exhausted until payments 18 
Are made in accord with the statute. 
2. Idaho Code 41-1839 can be read and reconciled with 19 
Idaho Code 49-1610 so that both statutes are effective and 
in force 
A. The sentence relied upon in 41-1839 Subsection 
3 supplements Idaho Code 49-1610 and probably 
allows Western Surety to recover its payments from 
the auctions. 
3. Good faith is onlyl applicable to whether Western Surety 
can recover its payment. 
4. Western Surety can use the equitable interpleader remedy 
which eliminates the need for judgments. 
5. Nick Hestead requests attorneys fees on appeal 
RESPONDENTS CROSS APPEAL 
CONCLUSION 
1. Nick Hestead contends the district court erred in not 
awarding the sales tax and loan interest damage 
11 
20 
23 
24 
25 
26 
26 
28 
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES 
American Surety Co of New York v Mills 232 F.841 C.C.A Idaho (1916) 
Bryant Motors v American States Insurance 118 Idaho 796, 800 P.2d 683 
(Ct App 1990) 
DeRouse v Higgens en 95 Idaho 173,176 
In Dahl v PSF Industries Inc 899 P.2d 445, 127 Idaho 232 (1995) 
Edmonds v Western Surety 962 P.2d 323( Colo App 1998) 
Frank et al v Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company 136 Misc 186, 
239 N. Y.S. 397, (1930) 
Hankins v McElroy dba Mac's Auto Sales, and Lawyers Surety Corporation 
313 Ark 394, 855 S.W. 2d 310 (1993) 
Mobile Telecommunication v Aetna Casualty 962 F Supp 952 (E.D. Miss) 
Mendenhall v Aldous 146 Idaho 434 (2008). 
Quintana v Quintana 119 Idaho 1, 802 P.2d 488 (1990) 
Seubert Excavators v Eucon Corp 125 Idaho 409, 871 P.2d 826 (1994) 
Shea v Owyhee County 66 Idaho 159, 156 P.2d 331 (1945) 
Spreader Specialists v Monroe Inc 114 Idaho 15,752 P.2d 617 (1988) 
State Dept of Health and Welfare v Housel 140 Idaho 96, 90 P.3d 321 (2004) 
State of Nevada Department of Motor Vehicles v Garcia Mendoza 114 Nev 1187, 
971 P.2d 377 (1998) 
Taylor v Neill 80 Idaho 90, at 94, 325 P .d 391 (1958) 
US Fidelity and Guarantee v Clover Creek 92 Idaho 889, 452 P .2d 993 (1969) 
Western Surety Company v Intrust Bank 20 S.W.3d 566 (Mo App W.D.2000) 
lli 
STATUTES AND RULES 
Alabama - Ala Admin Code 810-8--509 (3) (4). 
LC 41-1839 
LC. 49-1608 
LC. 48-1610 
Indiana - Ind. Code 9-23-2-2(e) 
Kansas - K.S.A. 8-2404 
Montana - MCA 61- 4- 126 (1) & (2) 
Nevada - N.R.S. 482-345 
Washington - RCWA 46.70.070 
iV 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This controversy arises out of competing claims upon an automobile dealer licensing 
statutory bond provided by (Appellant/Defendant) Western Surety to Best of the Best Auto 
Sales Inc, pursuant to Idaho Code 49-1608 and 49-1610. 
An auto auction claim on the bond for a dishonored check and one for a dishonored 
check plus additional damage were sent directly to Western Surety for payment. The checks 
were for vehicles Best of the Best purchased. The claims were initially denied, and then 
the auctions withheld vehicle titles from bona fide purchasers. Eventually they were paid by 
W estem Surety in the total amount of the bond - $20,000 in the summer of 2009. 
(Respondent/Cross Appellant/Plaintiff) Nick Hestead purchased a 2004 Ford F 350 
from Best of the Best in June 2007, but it had an undisclosed branded lemon title from 
California and had problems. He filed a lawsuit and proceeded through the Court system, 
finding out in August, 2009 that Western Surety had paid its bond amount to the auto auctions. 
Hestead obtained a Judgment in March, 2010 and made a bond claim based upon the 
Judgment and in accord with Idaho Code 49-1610(4) .. Western Surety responded that the bond 
had been paid and was "exhausted". 
Nick Hestead maintains the bond is not exhausted and can only be paid after obtaining 
a judgment. Idaho Code 49-1610 provides a "claim" cannot even be filed with the 
surety until a judgment is 30 days old. The "process" in subdivision 4 of this statute must be 
satisfied before a claim can be paid by the surety. Hestead also suggests that Western Surety 
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could have filed an interpleader to exhaust the bond, and take reasonable steps to give notice 
to all potential claimants since there were no judgment claimants at the time. 
Western Surety maintains that the requirement of a judgment leads to absurd results, 
higher costs, and a waiting period. They contend a key sentence in Idaho Code 41-1839 (3) 
makes Western Surety an "involuntary" payor so long as Western Surety acts in good faith in 
paying any "claim" presented to it, whether that "claim" complies with Idaho Code 49-1610 
or not 
Nick Hestead counters that there is no constitutional, common law or other legal duty 
for the Legislature to require a bond; the requirement of a judgment is found in many 
automobile dealer bond statutes throughout the United States; Western Surety is well aware of 
this requirement, several state courts have required the judgment "process" in their 
automobile dealer bond statutes to be followed; and "involuntary" means Western Surety can 
recover improper payments from payees, indemnitors, and subrogees, providing it acts in 
good faith. 
The Honorable Susan Wiebe found that Idaho Code 49-1610 is a specific statute 
applicable to this controversy, mentioned the word "judgment" at least four times, and must 
be followed. She said Western Surety acted in good faith, but did not comply with the statute. 
She awarded $12,500 in damages. 
Nick Hestead asks that the Summary Judgment be affirmed and in a cross appeal 
asks that the Supreme Court find that the sales tax and interest paid by Hestead to the lender 
are "damage or loss" covered by the bond. 
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Both parties ask for attorneys fees under Idaho Code 41-1839. 
2. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Nick Hestead agrees with the Course of Proceedings discussion in Appellants Brief, 
except for the statement on Page 16 that "The Motions were heard on December 10, 2010. 
Tr. Vol 1)". Only Nick Hesteads Motion for Summary Judgment and Western Surety's 
Motion to Strike two affidavits for consideration were heard on that date. Western Surety's 
Motion for Summary Judgment was to be heard on December 30, 2010. (Tr Vol 1 P 4 L 17-
22). 
3. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A 
NICK HESTEAD BOUGHT A TRUCK WHICH WAS AN 
UNDISCLOSED BRANDED LEMON FROM BEST OF THE 
BEST AND OBTAINED A JUDGMENT 
CNA Surety dba Western Surety writes surety bonds under automobile dealer licensing 
statutes. It apparently writes them throughout the United States as it has been a party to many 
reported cases. 
Western Surety has been writing automobile surety bonds for at least 10 years in Idaho 
and is fully aware of the requirements of Idaho Code 49-1610. In a letter dated February 18, 
2000 to an attorney for a used car dealer, Western Surety Assistant Vice President Michael 
Dow, stated "Subsection (4) of Section 49--1610 of the Idaho Code provides for recovery 
under the bond as follows:" and then quotes verbatim Subsection (4). (R. Vol 1 p 32-33) 
During the year 2007 Western Surety provided a $20,000 bond pursuant to Idaho Code 
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49-1610 on behalf of Best of the Best Auto Sales Inc. (R. Vol 1 p 17- Statement of 
Uncontested Facts; R. Vol 1 p 10 - Answer) . 
On or about June 7, 2007, Nick Hestead entered into an agreement to purchase a Ford 
F350 from Best of the Best Auto Sales Inc (R. Vol 1 p 99, 108). He financed the purchase 
through his credit union and is still repaying the loan. (R.Vol 1 p 101 - Dep Hestead P 12 L 
10-11). The truck subsequently turned out to be a branded lemon, with many problems in the 
past and even had problems just three weeks before Nick Hesteads deposition on October 19, 
2010. (R. Vol 1 p 101- Dep Hestead P 12 L 19-25; P 13 L 1-5). When Nick Hestead decided 
to get rid of the vehicle he went to Dan Wiebold and learned the vehicle was worth much less 
than he thought because of the lemon brand. (R.Vol l p 102 - Dep Hestead P 19 L 12-25). 
On September 2, 2008, a lawsuit was filed against Ron Zechman dba Best of the Best 
Auto Sales. (R. Vol 1 p 106 - Dep Hestead 34 L 11-13). The lawsuit alleged Best of the 
Best sold the F 350 Ford Truck to Morgan Creek Homes on December 18, 2006. disclosing 
the Lemon Law Buy Back, but Best of the Best did not disclose this fact to Nick Hestead when 
he bought the truck a year later. (R.Vol 1 p 110; Complaint Paragraph IX). The lawsuit 
alleged this is an unfair and deceptive act and practice and violates the Idaho Consumer 
Protection Act (Count II) and is a breach of express and implied warranties (Count I) (R. Vol 
1 p 108 -110) 
The lawsuit asked for damages consisting of the diminished value of the truck 
$12,500 , the amount of the sales tax on $12,500 which is $750, and "interest Plaintiff has 
paid on borrowed funds of $12,500 which he incurred in order to purchase the vehicle." 
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(R.Vol l p 110 - Complaint Paragraph XI). 
The lawsuit eventually went to trial and took a day. (R. Vol l p 104 - Dep Hestead P 
25 L20-22). The Honorable James Morfitt entered Judgment for Nick Hestead, finding 
"Defendant Best of the Best Auto Sales Inc violated Idaho 
Transportation Department ID APA Regulation 39 .02.07 .400 
relating to required disclosures of branded titles, the Idaho 
Consumer Protection Act at Idaho Code 48-603(7), (14), 
(17) and breached express and implied warranties under 
the Uniform Commercial Code" 
(R. Vol 1 p 29) 
Judge Morfitt then awarded Nick Hestead damages of $12,500, plus interest from the 
date of purchase at the rate of 10.9% on that amount which totals $3729, and sales tax damage 
of $750. (R.Vol 1 p 29) 
B. 
TWO AUTO AUCTIONS WERE GIVEN INSUFFICIENT FUNDS CHECKS FOR 
VEHICLES BEST OF THE BEST PURCHASED AND MADE DIRECT CLAIMS 
ON THE WESTERN SURETY BOND 
Meanwhile in 2008, a business entity wrote checks to two auto auctions that were not 
honored. The auto auctions did not go to Court. Instead they directly sent demand letters 
to Western Surety. 
One check was from "Best of the Best Auto Sales dba Z' s Paint and Body Ron 
Zechman Sr". to Brashers Idaho Auto Auction for $9,360. and dated September 19, 2008. 
(R.Vol 2 p 140). Brashers sent a claim directly to Western Surety which was received by 
Western Surety on November 13, 2008. (R. Vol 2 p 139) Brashers attached three invoices 
dated April 24, 2008, to support its claim. (R.Vol 2 p 141-143). Apparently Brashsers had 
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extended some kind of credit to this entity from April to September. 
Dealers Auction made its claim against "Principal: Ron Zechman dba Best of the 
Best" in its letter of October 10, 2008. (R. Vol 2 p 133) The letter states: "Ron Zechman 
dba Best of the Best obtained vehicles from Dealers pursuant to his agreement with Dealers 
with the intent to defraud Dealer's as evidenced by his continuous payment of insufficient 
funds by way of check." (R. Vol 2 p 133). On December 16, 2008, Dealers sent a letter with 
the same language, except it stated "Principal: Best of the Best Inc." and substituted "Ron 
Zechman dba Best of the Best Auto Sales Inc". ( R.Vol II p 134) 
Dealers Auto Auction was given an insufficient funds check on or about June 4, 2008, 
in the amount of $8,810. (R.Vol II p 131). A summary dated September 22, 2008. and 
addressed to "Ron Best of the Best", shows that 7 cars were unpaid as of that date. (R. Vol 
II p 130). It appears that a 1998 Alero was acquired on February 15, 2006 and still not paid 
for. (R. Vol II p 130). Thereafter Dealers apparently extended credit for purchases of 6 other 
vehicles throughout 2007. (R. Vol II p 130). 
The record appears to show that the purchasers of these vehicles paid for their vehicles 
and were bona fide purchasers. (R. Vol II p 157 May 4, 2009 email "Western Surety received 
a phone call from bona fide purchaser Selena Mata."). 
Western Surety denied the claims of the auto auctions. But, then the auctions said 
they would not release remaining vehicle titles until the checks and vehicles were paid. The 
auctions told the bona fide purchasers to make claims upon the Western Surety bond which a 
couple did and thereafter the auctions accepted payments from Western Surety and released 
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titles 
(Nick Hestead seriously questions whether the auctions had the right to withhold titles 
because the auctions knew Best of the Best would sell the vehicles to bona fide purchasers for 
value) 
C. 
NICK HESTEAD MADE A CLAIM 
ON THE WESTERN SURETY BOND AND COMPLIED WITH THE 
PROCEDURE IN IDAHO CODE 49-1610 
Western Surety points out that 30 days after an order was entered by Judge Brad Ford, 
Nick Hestead filed a claim through the Idaho Transportation Department based upon two 
Orders that were entered. (R.Vol II 162-166) (Appellants Brief P 14 -15). 
Hestead did in fact recognize that Idaho Code 49-1610 required a judgment stating in 
the September 19, 2009 letter that this was the language in Idaho Code 49-1610 and detailing 
that position. At the end of the letter Hesteads counsel stated "I believe the Order is the 
equivalent of a Judgment under Idaho law." (R.Vol II p 174 last paragraph). With regard to 
that statement it is important to note the amount of the claim was minimal - $877 .50 and 
counsel thought that generally orders sometimes can be judgments, and quite frankly, not 
much time was spent at this point. The Supreme Court has made the distinction very clear in 
two recent cases. Spokane Structures Inc v Equitable Investment 148 Idaho 616. 226 P.3rd 
1263 (2010); T.J.T. Inc v Mori 148 Idaho 825, 230 P.3d 425 (2010) Nick Hestead 
concedes that these orders are not "judgments". 
The important fact to be gleaned from this discussion is that no claim was made on the 
bond for the damage Nick Hestead claimed as a result of the deception by Best of the Best 
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until Hestead obtained a judgment. And, the claim based upon the two orders for $877.50 was 
made through the "custodian of the bond" the Idaho Transportation Department. (R. Vol 1 p 
89 - ITD Letter, last paragraph) 
After Judge Morfitt entered judgment, demand was made upon Western Surety for 
payment under the bond. 
Western Surety admitted in its Answer that 
1. Demand has been made upon Best of the Best Auto Sales Inc for payment of the 
judgment and no payment was made within 30 days. (R. Vol 1 p 11 - Answer Paragraph 14) 
2. Plaintiff Nick Hestead made a sworn demand upon Western Surety within one (1) 
year of the Judgment and after 30 days after the date of the Judgment. (R. Vol 1 p 12 Answer 
Paragraph 17) 
3. No person, entity or organization has obtained a Judgment against Best of the Best 
Auto Sales Inc and made a claim upon the bond. (R. Vol 1 p .12 Answer Paragraph 19) 
Western Surety denied that the Judgment is covered by the bond on the basis that the 
"bond has been exhausted". (R.Vol 1 p.12 Answer Paragraph 16 & First Affirmative 
Defense). 
D. 
THE IDAHO TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT TAKES NO 
POSITION WITH REGARD TO THE PROCEDURE FOR PAYMENT 
OF AUTO DEALER BOND CLAIMS 
Daryl Marler has been Dealer Licensing Program Supervisor Daryl at the Idaho 
Department of Transportation for 5 ½ years. (R. 7 5 Dep Marler P 4 L 1 7- 19). He directs 
dealer licensing which involves licensing, auditing. monitoring. and enforcement upon all 
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motor vehicle dealers, and he directs motor vehicle investigations.(R. 75 (Dep Marler P 5 L 9-
20) He stated that there is a specific statute - Idaho Code 49-1610 and/or 49-1608 - that deals 
with the conditions under which a dealers bond can be liable for a claim.( R. 75 Dep Marler P 
6 Ll0-16). He at no time in the deposition referenced or was even asked about Idaho Code 
41-1839. (R. 73-88.Dep Marler). 
Mr.Marler's testimony was very clear that ITD has not taken a position regarding 
whether Judgments are or are not required for bond payments. He testified: 
Q. And does your department have a position on whether or not sureties can pay 
claims made by consumers in Idaho on Lhe motor vehicle dealer bonds without 
having a judgment? 
A. To my knowledge we don't make any - any- any statements in regard to the 
validity of the claim or anything else. Its just we send it in, and then its up 
to the surety company and then the complainant. 
(R.30 Dep Marler P 30 L 15-22) 
Q Now does your department ever, in its interactions with sureties take 
a position with the surety as to whether or not a particular claim ought 
to be paid? 
A.No 
(R.83 Dep Marler P 38 L 24-25; P 39 L 1-3) 
Q. Does your department have a manual, other than an employment manual? 
A. We do have a dealer operations procedure manual. 
Q. How many pages long is that? 
A. It includes the manual for investigations and for dealer licensing and I'm 
guessing it probably somewhere around - single sided sheets. I don't remember 
how many pages it has, but its - covers a lot of issues. 
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Q. Do you know, does it cover surety issues at all? 
A. No 
Q.Does it cover bond issues at all? 
A. I don't think there's anything mentioned - under the dealer licensing part 
there is about the requirement for the dealer bond and stuff like that, but 
as far as handling bond claims and things like that, there's nothing I am 
aware of. 
(R.85 Marler Dep P45-46). 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Is Nick Hestead entitled to Attorneys Fees pursuant to Idaho Code 41-1839 
2. Did the Trial Court commit error when it did not award the sales tax and interest paid 
the lender as a "loss or damage" under Idaho Code 49-1610 
ARGUMENT 
1 
THE WESTERN SURETY BOND IS A STATUTORY BOND 
AND ITS ACTIONS MUST BE IN ACCORD WITH THE BOND 
STATUTES. IT CANNOT REWRITE OR REVISE IDAHO LAW 
The Western Surety bond is a statutory bond, not an insurance policy. As a statutory 
bond it must follow the procedures in the statute, just as a claimant must do. 
Bryant Motors v American States Insurance 118 Idaho 796, 800 P.2d 683 (Ct App 
1990) discussed whether there is coverage of particular claims and persons under Idaho· s 
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automobile bond statute. The case states general rules regarding the auto bond as follows: 
"The obligation of a surety on a bond required by statute is determined by the 
provisions of the statute. Royal Indemnity Co. of New York v Business 
Factors Inc.96 Ariz 165, 393 P.2d 261 (1964). Thus such bonds are construed 
in the light of the statute creating the obligations secured and of the purposes 
for which the bond is required, as expressed in the statute. (citation omitted) ........ . 
. . . . . . It is presumed that the intention of the parties was to execute a bond such 
as the law required. 12 Am Jur 2d Bonds Section 26 at 495-96 (1964) 
118 Idaho at 798 
Bryant was cited with approval in a subsequent case. In Seubert Excavators v Eucon 
~ 125 Idaho 409 at 417, 871 P.2d 826 (1994) our Supreme Court said: 
" Furthermore, it is a principle of Idaho law that the obligation of a surety on 
a bond required by statute is determined by the obligations and purposes set 
forth in the statute. Bryant Motors Inc v American States Inc 118 Idaho 796, 
798, 800 P.2d 683, 685 ..... " 
Idaho's law regarding an auto dealers bond includes two statutes: Idaho Code 49-1608 
and Idaho Code 49-1610. Idaho Code 49-1608 both at the time applicable in this case, and 
now, require in pertinent part: 
" Before any dealer's license shall be issued by the department to any applicant 
the applicant shall procure and file with the department good and sufficient 
bond in the amount shown, conditioned that the applicant shall not practice any 
fraud, make any fraudulent representation or violate any of the provisions of 
this chapter, rules of the department, or the provisions of chapter 5, title 49, 
section 49-1418, or chapter 6, title 48, Idaho Code, or federal motor vehicle 
safety standards, or odometer fraud in the conduct of the business for which he 
is licensed. " 
The next applicable section, Idaho Code 49-1610, refers to "Process"'. In pertinent 
part it states: 
"49-1610 . Right of action for loss by fraud - Process. - (1) If any person 
shall suffer any loss or damage by reason of any fraud practiced on him or 
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fraudulent representations made to him by a licensed dealer or one (1) of 
the dealer's salesmen acting for the dealer, in his behalf or within the scope 
of the employment of salesman, or shall suffer any loss or damage by reason 
of the violation by the dealer or salesman of any of the provisions of this 
chapter, or chapter 5, title 49, Idaho Code, or section 49-1418, Idaho Code 
or chapter 6, title 48 Idaho Code, or any applicable rule or regulation of 
the board, or federal odometer law or regulation, that person shall have a 
right of action against the dealer and his salesman. 
(2) ..... . 
(3) ...... . 
(4) Whenever any person is awarded a final judgment in a court of competent 
jurisdiction in the state of Idaho for any loss or damage by reason of the 
violation by such dealer or salesman of any of the provisions of this chapter, 
chapter 5, title 49, section 49-1418, or chapter 6, title 48, Idaho Code, or any 
rule or regulation of the department in connection with the purchase of a 
vehicle, or federal motor vehicle safety standards, or in connection with the 
purchase of a vehicle if the loss or damage is a result of odometer tampering 
or odometer fraud, the judgment creditor may file a verified claim with the 
corporate surety who has provided the dealer's surety bond, or with the 
chairman of the dealer advisory board where the dealer has deposited with the 
director a cash bond or certificate of deposit. 
(a) The claim shall be filed no sooner than thirty(30) days and no later 
than one (1) year after the judgment has become final. 
(b) The claim shall: 
(1) Be accompanied by a certified copy of the judgment 
(2) State the amount of the claim if different from the judgment amount 
and 
(3) State that demand has been made upon the dealer for payment of the 
Judgment, and the dealer has failed to pay the judgment in full within 
thirty (30) days. 
LC. 49-1610 is not ambiguous. Its title is "Process". Subdivision 4 seems 
straightforward, and nowhere in Western Surety's 43 page brief does Western Surety 
claim it is ambiguous. Subsection (4) (a) mandates that the claim "shall be filed no 
sooner than thirty (30) days and no later than one (1) year after the judgment has become 
final". The Supreme Court has held that "shall" when used in a statute imposes a 
mandatory obligation. (Mendenhall v Aldous 146 Idaho 434 at 438 note 4 (2008). 
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Subsection (4) uses the word "Judgment" four times, as stated by Trial Court Judge Susan 
Wiebe in her bench decision. (Transcript P 19) . It consistently uses the term "shall". 
Thus, Nick Hestead does not understand how Western Surety can say that a claim can 
be filed anytime, and paid any time when subsection (4)(a) states it can't be. 
Nick Hestead followed the statutory process for making a claim on Best of the Best 
Auto Sales Inc's bond. (R.Vol 1 p 12 Answer Paragraph 17). No other purported claimant 
has ever done so. Hestead has obtained a judgment that clearly states that violations of Idaho 
Code 49-1610 have occurred and that judgment has been presented in accordance with the 
judgment claims procedure. (R.Vol 1 p 29-30) 
Western Surety cannot unilaterally rewrite this statute, and claim that the "Process" 
means nothing. Western Surety is simply writing this procedure out of the Idaho Code. 
Section 4 of Idaho Code 49-1610 becomes meaningless and mere surplusage if a surety can 
pay any claim that comes into its offices without regard as to whether there is a judgment. As 
our Supreme Court has stated: 
said: 
"If possible, it is incumbent upon a court to give a statute an interpretation 
which will not in effect nullify it" (DeRouse v Higgensen 95 Idaho 173,176) 
In Dohl v PSF Industries Inc 899 P.2d 445, 127 Idaho 232 (1995) our Supreme Court 
"Statutes are to be construed to ascertain and give effect to the purpose of 
the legislation and to give force and effect to every part of the provision. 
(Citation omitted) .... 
We wiJJ not presume that the legislature performed the idle act of enacting 
a superfluous statute." 
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A. 
THE JUDGMENT REQUIREMENT IS A RESULT OF A LEGISLATIVE DECISION 
BASED UPON COMPETING ARGUMENTS AND POLICIES AND LEGISLATURES 
AROUND THE COUNTRY REQUIRE JUDGMENTS 
There is no constitutional, common law, or extrinsic rule that requires that a legislature 
set up an automobile dealer bond. system. The decision to do so, and the parameters of 
claims and payments have been set up by legislatures around the country after considering 
many arguments and suggestions, including those advanced. by Western Surety in 
its brief. Our Legislature has chosen Idaho Code 49-1610, which requires judgments. 
Some other states allow a direct action (Washington - RCWA 46. 70.070), many require 
judgments (infra), some require execution upon judgments before filing a claim (infra), and 
some provide for administrative resolution of judgments. (infra). 
Western Surety expresses a dislike for our Idaho system. It claims in its brief that 
Plaintiff position would lead to "absurb, and unreasonably harsh results." (App Br 35). It 
claims · Claimants would be forced to wait until the statute of limitations had run ... " (App Br 
36). 
On the other hand, one very good reason is that a Judgment provides certainty that the 
claim is valid. This serves the creditor, dealer and the bond company. The bond company 
can pursue its claim for indemnification and the dealer cannot claim the bond company 
improperly paid the claim. The bond company is exonerated from any bad faith or other claim 
by its principal or guarantor or creditor. The dealer is secure knowing the bond company 
won't pay a claim with which the dealer disagrees. Yet, the creditor knows the claim will still 
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be paid if the creditor prevails. 
And a Judgment is a public record, giving notice to others of the a potential bond 
claim. 
In addition, a dealer who defends a claim in Court incurs attorneys fees and expense 
and knows the bond is in the wings, all of which should promote settlement in the smaller 
cases that are typical of vehicle disputes. Small Claims Court is available for many of the 
disputes that typically arise between a dealer and its customers. 
A surety shouldn't be able to pick and choose who will be paid .. 
But regardless of how Nick Hestead or Western Surety feels, the determination 
has been made by the Legislature. 
B. 
MANY STATES REQUIRE A JUDGMENT AGAINST THE 
AUTO DEALER FOR A BOND CLAIM TO BE PAID 
Missouri requires a judgment. Western Surety even litigated a reported interpleader 
case in connection with this Missouri statute. (Western Surety Company v Intrust Bank 20 
S. W.3d 566 (Mo App W.D.2000) stating at 570 that "Considering the language of Section 
301.588.1(4) it is significant that the triggering event for payment of the proceeds of the 
bond is the receipt of a final judgment." (Emphasis added) 
Colorado requires a judgment before an auto dealer bond must make payment and 
Western Surety has litigated a case there concerning whether an unpaid Judgment was entirely 
covered by the bond. (Edmonds v Western Surety 962 P.2d 323 (Colo App 1998) 
The Judgment requirement is widely used throughout the United States. Some states 
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have even more restrictive procedures. Here are some examples: 
Alabama - A claim may be made after a judgment is entered against the principal 
(dealer) by filing the Judgment with an administrative body. (Ala Adrnin Code 810-8--509) 
(3) (4). Alabama even requires that the judgment creditor try to collect from other sources 
before filing the claim. 
Indiana - Ind.Code 9-23-2-2(e) requires a $25,000 bond to cover fines and penalties 
and to secure the "payment of damages to a person aggrieved by a violation of this chapter by 
the licensee after a judgment has been obtained." 
Kansas - Requires a final judgment be presented to the Director who then makes an 
administrative determination as to whether the Judgment should be paid from the Bond. 
(K.S.A. 8-2404) 
Montana - Montana requires that a person who suffers loss or damage ....... "shall 
obtain a judgment from a court of competent jurisdiction prior to collecting on the bond of the 
dealer broker, wholesaler, or auto auction .. , ...... (MCA 61- 4- 126) (1) & (2) 
C. 
THREE JURISDICTIONS HA VE REQUIRED COMPLIANCE 
WITH AN AUTO DEALER BOND CLAIM PROCEDURE 
Arkansas requires a Judgment and then requires that the Judgment be presented to the 
Department of Financing Administration before a lawsuit can be brought against a surety. 
Hankins v McElroy dba Mac·s Auto Sales, and Lawyers Surety Corporation 313 Ark 394. 
855 S.W. 2d 310) (1993). The Arkansas Supreme Court stated: 
"Section 23-112-603 further provides that: the proceeds of the 
bond shall be paid upon receipt by the Director of the Department 
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of Finance and Administration of a final judgment from an Arkansas 
Court of competent jurisdiction against the principal and in favor 
of an aggrieved party . 
. . . . . . "The record does not show the appellant availed himself of 
this administrative remedy. Instead of presenting his judgment to 
the Director of DF & A, appellant sought declaratory relief in the 
circuit court." 
.... "Clearly this is a procedure the legislature intended to be 
followed when it delegated regulatory jurisdiction of used motor 
vehicle dealers to DF & A ...... " 
(855 S.W.2d at 312) 
Nevada requires a Judgment prior to making a claim on a cash auto dealer bond, or 
payment by the Director after review. After obtaining a Judgment the claimant is required to 
present its claim to the Director of the Department of Motor Vehicles for payment. The 
judgment is binding upon the surety or cash bond. (N.R.S. 482-345) 
State of Nevada Department of Motor Vehicles v Garcia Mendoza 114 Nev 1187, 971 
P.2d 377 (1998) held that this procedure must be followed in order to have a valid claim. 
In Footnote 1 at 971 P.2d, at 379, the Supreme Court of Nevada stated: 
"The Honorable Justice Rose argues, in dissent, that the 
DMV had priority over Garcia-Mendoza because the DMV 
has a prior right of set-off and its claim was prior in time. 
This is not the case for two reasons: First, although it is 
true that the DMV had an earlier claim against the dealer, 
the DMV did not have an earlier claim against the bond. 
In fact, the DMV has never made a proper claim against 
the bond, because as discussed below, the DMV did not 
attempt to follow the statutory procedures specifically 
set forth for making such a claim. Instead, in an exercise 
of power unsupported by authority, the DMV simply 
helped itself to the money. Second, the DMV's common 
law right to set-off cannot take precedence over its statutory 
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duty to pay out on the bond in the manner established by 
the legislature. In this case, Garcia-Mendoza followed the 
statutory procedures for executing upon the bond; the DMV 
did not. In short, Garcia Mendoza perfected her claim first 
and is entitled to priority to the money." 
In Frank et al v Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company 136 Misc 186, 239 N.Y.S. 
397, (1930) the Supreme Court of New York County said: 
"The questions presented for determination thus relate to said payments 
by the defendant, aggregating $4,001.50. When paying the fund into 
the Court, is the defendant entitled to deduct such amount from the limit 
of $10,000 fixed in the policy on all judgments recovered upon claims 
arising out of the same transaction for bodily injuries or death. Considering 
first the payments in settlement of claims of $3,383.50: The provision as 
to the limit of insurance on all judgments was inserted in the policy pursuant 
to the statute for the protection of judgment creditors. It is specifically in the 
language required by the statute, and as such limitation applies only to 
judgments, any other liability under the policy is not affected by such 
limitation. When the insurer paid the claims on which no judgments had 
been obtained, it did so voluntarily, without regard to the limitation, which 
provides only for judgments, and it took the chance of being required to 
thereafter pay out the full limitation of $10,000 upon judgments ..... 
239 N. Y.S. 402 
The results of these cases make sense. A surety bond is not insurance. It is an 
obligation based upon statutory parameters. Coverage and the process for claims can be 
changed, expanded or contracted as the legislature wishes. 
D. 
THE SURETY BOND IS NOT EXHAUSTED 
UNTIL PAYMENTS ARE MADE IN ACCORD 
WITH THE STATUTE 
The Frank case holds that payments not made upon judgments are not to be credited 
to the obligation of the surety. Admittedly this is an old case that has not been cited, but it 
- 18 -
appears to be the closest case on point. 
The State of Nevada case seems to imply this same result wherein it directs the Nevada 
DMV to pay the cash bond claim to the perfected claimant, despite the fact that the bond 
money had been paid to itself at an earlier date. 
Western Surety in its brief and before, criticizes the "volunteer" language in the Frank 
case as in conflict with Idaho Code 41-1839, but actually the "involuntary" language in 
41-1839 helps Western Surety because it may be able to recoup its payments to the two 
auctions. 
2. 
IDAHO CODE 41-1839 CAN BE READ 
AND RECONCILED WITH IDAHO CODE 
49-1610 SO THAT BOTH STATUTES 
ARE EFFECTIVE AND IN FORCE 
In State Dept of Health and Welfare v Housel 140 Idaho 96, 104, 90 P.3d 321 (2004) 
our Supreme Court said the following with regard to statutory interpretation: 
"It is the duty of courts, in construing statutes, to harmonize and 
reconcile laws whenever possible and to adopt the construction of 
statutory provisions which harmonize and reconciles them with other 
statutory provisions." 
Idaho Code 41-1839 is an attorneys fee statute. That is what the title says and that is 
how it reads. 
Idaho Code 49-1610 can be read with this provision. Since Idaho Code 49-1610 
requires a Judgment and provides for certain cutoffs for filing them as "claims"with the 
surety, the reference to a "claim" in Idaho Code 41-1839 when addressing auto dealer bond 
claims, refers to those that comply with Idaho Code 49-1610. 
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For example, if an auto dealer bond claim not reduced to judgment was presented to 
the surety and then a lawsuit filed after 60 days had passed, the Surety would presumably not 
be liable for attorneys fees and the lawsuit would be dismissed. 
If a claim based upon a judgment was presented to the surety and the surety refused to 
pay within 60 days, then presumably the surety would be liable for the amount of the judgment 
and attorneys fees under Idaho Code 41-1839 if the claimant prevailed. 
Obviously, a "claim" not reduced to judgment might be valid under different bond 
claims (fidelity, performance, or others) because many don't have the '"judgment''requirement 
of Idaho Code 49-1610. Appellant Western Surety's brief discusses for example US Fidelity 
and Guarantee v Clover Creek 92 Idaho 889. 452 P.2d 993 (1969) but it does not deal with an 
express statutory bond or a judgment requirement. 
A. 
THE SENTENCE RELIED UPON 
IN 41-1839 Subsection 3 SUPPLEMENTS 
IDAHO CODE 49-1610 AND PROBABLY ALLOWS 
WESTERN SURETY TO RECOVER ITS PAYMENTS FROM THE AUCTIONS 
Western Surety emphasizes one sentence in the middle of subsection 3 of the Idaho 
Code 41-1839 which they essentially say overrules and nullifies Idaho Code 49-1610. 
Appellant Western Surety has seriously misinterpreted the applicable sentence in 
subpart 3 and its effect. 
The sentence states: 
... "The surety shall be authorized to determine what portion or amount of 
such claim is justly due the creditor or claimant and payment or tender of 
the amount so determined by the surety shall not be deemed a volunteer 
payment and shall not prejudice any right of the surety to indemnification 
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and/or subrogation so long as such determination and payment by the surety 
be made in good faith." 
First there must be a proper "claim''. Idaho Code 41-1839 doesn·t define the process 
for a claim on the auto dealer bond. Idaho Code 49-1610 does. 
Next, if it determines that the "claim" is due, and makes a payment, the payment is 
not a "volunteer" payment. What does that mean? 
Idaho Case law has defined payments which are made as a "volunteer" or "voluntary" 
and explained what is meant by those terms. 
In Quintana v Quintana 119 Idaho 1, 802 P.2d 488 (1990) the Idaho Court of Appeals 
said that a personal representative that paid Federal Estate Taxes did not pay them as a 
"volunteer" so the personal representative was able to recover a proportionate payment from 
one of the heirs. This was because the personal representative was obligated by law to 
determine the tax liability and pay it. 
In Shea v Owyhee County 66 Idaho 159, 156 P.2d 331 (1945) the Supreme Court held 
that certain taxes were required to be paid, and therefor~ they were not "voluntary payments" 
and applications for refunds could be made when new facts indicated some of the tax payments 
were excessive. 
Thus surety payments are "involuntary" and all this means is that the surety can 
recover its payments through subrogation, indemnity from the principal, or even when 
wrongfully made to a claimant. It means that Western Surety can recover its improper 
payments from the auto auctions - and that is the course it should be pursuing, not an appeal of 
Nick Hestead' s proper claim. 
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A good example and discussion of "volunteer" is found in Mobile Telecommunication 
v Aetna Casualty 962 F Supp 952 (E.D. Miss) wherein Aetna paid one million dollars on a 
claim and later became entitled to its money back. The Court reviewed Mississippi law. 
stating it is in accord with the general law on the subject, and concluded that the payment was 
made as a "volunteer" and that absent an agreement with the insured, or a mistake of fact, or 
fraud, Aetna couldn't recoup its payment. 
Idaho Code 41-1839 (3) provides for the opposite result. The purpose of this sentence 
is to allow the Surety to recover its money if an improper payment is made, or to recover a 
payment from its principal, so long as the Surety is acting in good faith. These sentences are 
addressing "recovery" of money paid, not a claims process. 
For example, if the surety paid $5000 on a claim, and the claimant decided to litigate 
against the surety and recovered nothing, the surety could demand that the claimant refund the 
$5000 payment it advanced. If the surety paid a Judgment under Idaho Code 49-1610, and 
the Judgment was later vacated because of an irregularity, the surety could recover its 
payment. In addition, since payments under Idaho Code 41-1839 are not as a "volunteer" 
a principal has difficulty refusing indemnification. 
Going one step further, therefore, if the surety ignores Idaho Code 49-1610 and pays 
"claims" not reduced to a judgment, the surety can recover those payments to the two auto 
auction payments providing it can show it acted in good faith. Western Surety is in fact not 
subject to paying more than $20,000. It can recoup the "involuntary" payments it has 
erroneously made to the auto auctions. 
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3. 
GOOD FAITH IS ONLY APPLICABLE TO WHETHER 
WESTERN SURETY CAN RECOVER ITS PAYMENT 
Appellants brief misstates Nick Hesteads position regarding "Good Faith". His 
position is that good faith is not a legal defense to compliance with Idaho Code 49--1610, 
because legally there is no auto auction claim for Western Surety to pay because there simply 
is no judgment. So how can there be any "good faith" and not abide by the law? 
"Good Faith" It is a standard by which the conduct of the surety is measured to 
determine whether the surety can recoup its payment from a wrongfully paid claimant, recover 
through indemnity, or recover through subrogation. It doesn't absolve Western Surety from 
complying with the statute. It does give Western Surety the right to recover its money as an 
"involuntary payor." 
Western Surety is quite wrong when it says that Nick Hestead concedes there is good 
faith. Nick Hestead never asserted "bad faith" because Western Surety never claimed good 
faith applied to Idaho Code 49-1610, until it filed its Memorandum in Opposition to the 
Motion for Summary Judgment in November, 2010. Plaintiffs counsel sent several letters to 
Western Surety asking for reasons why Western Surety did not need to conform to Idaho Code 
49-1610. No response talked about "good faith". 
1Westem Surety's lack of good faith is demonstrated by: 
Assistant Vice President Michael Dow in his letter where he presents the Judgment requirement (R. Vol II.32-33) .. 
Western Surety paid one bounced check and a second check plus around $2000. Nick Hestead is nor ready to concede that the 
auctions had the right to withhold titles from bona fide purchasers. 
Western Surety is well aware of the imerpleader remedy. 
There is no evidence that Western Surety made even a cursory attempt to determine if there were other claimants 
Western Surety as llil involuntary payor should have tried to recoup its money . 
It is not dear that the Dealers Auro Auction check was a transaction with the corporation, instead of Ron Zechman 
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4. 
WESTERN SURETY CAN USE THE EQUITABLE INTERPLEADER 
REMEDY WHICH ELIMINATES THE NEED FOR JUDGMENTS 
Aside from the law. a policy problem with Western Surety of ignoring the Judgment 
requirement and paying "claims" not reduced to judgments and sent directly to it by two auto 
auctions, is that legitimate claimants are left out of the process. 
This can be solved by a proper interpleader that makes a reasonable attempt to give 
notice to all potential existing claimants. Some notice is necessary because those who read 
Idaho Code 49-1610 are led to believe that claims cannot be filed until 30 days after the 
judgment has been entered and a demand made upon the dealer. Unperfected claimants, are 
certainly left with the impression that a claim of any kind cannot be made until that event has 
occurred. Therefore, if Western Surety wants to discharge its liability "early" it needs to 
make a reasonable effort to contact all potential claimants and then use the interpleader 
remedy. 
Interpleader can solve Western Surety's dilemma and Western Surety is well aware of 
it. Western Surety's counsel acknowledged this in his statement to the trial court: 
" ..... Nobody disputes that there is an interpleader statute 
in the rule, and that seems to be the reason why counsel 
wanted to get the pleading in front of the court, which is 
to say, here's another case where Western Surety used 
an interpleader action. Nobody disputes the rule." 
(Transcript p. 4, Ll 8-15) 
In fact Interpleader has been used by sureties in Idaho for almost a hundred years. 
(American Surety Co of New York v Mills 232 F.841 C.C.A Idaho (1916) (holding this 
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equitable remedy may be used, but no creditor should be preferred over another under the 
circumstances of the case). 
The record shows that the remedy was used for auto bonds in the Tytan Motors and 
Boise Auto Brokers cases in 2000 and 2001. (R Vol II p 176 - offered into evidence by 
Western Surety). 
Western Surety used this remedy in the reported case of Western Surety Company v 
Intrust Bank 20 S. W.3d 566 (Mo App W.D.2000) 
Claims Manager Thomas Snyder acknowledged the interpleader remedy in his April 
19, 2010 letter wherein he stated" An interpleader action does get filed in cases were (sic) 
there is more than one claim at the same time and the total amount of those claims is in excess 
of the penal sum." (R.Vol II p 187) 
Thus, Western Surety can include perfected claims Gudgments) and potential claims at 
one time, tender the amount of its bond, and close the file upon bonds which have no 
reasonable likelihood of indemnification from the principal and for which the claims are well 
in excess of $20,000. 
And Interpleader notice is now even easier. ITD Dealer Licensing Supervisor Daryl 
Marler testified that he could easily get on the computer and pull up every complaint on a 
dealer that has been entered. (R 81 Marler Dep P 30 L 4-8). 
5. 
NICK HESTEAD REQUESTS 
ATTORNEYS FEES ON APPEAL 
Nick Hestead requests attorneys fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code 41-1839 (1), (4) 
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and IAR 41 
According to Appellants memorandum this section is applicable to attorneys fees 
a wards because this section and 12-123 are the exclusive remedies for obtaining attorneys fees 
in disputes arising out of insurance policies citing Mortensen v Stewart Title 149 Idaho 437, 
447, 235 P,3d 387, 389 (2010), They claim Idaho Code 41-1839 applies, 
Nick Hestead asks for attorneys fees pursuant to 41-1839 (1) (3) (4) as an 
intended,beneficiary under the bond, Hestead notes Smith v Great Basin Grain 98 Idaho 266, 
281-282 (1977) which allowed a claimant to recover attorneys from a surety pursuant to this 
section. If Idaho Code 41-1839 does not apply then 
RESPONDENTS CROSS APPEAL 
1. 
PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENTS CONTEND THE 
DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN NOT A WARDING 
THE SALES TAX AND LOAN INTEREST DAMAGE 
Idaho Code 49-1610 provides that the bond will cover any ''loss or damage" contained 
in the judgment. Trial Judge Susan Wiebe did not award damage claims for $750 in sales 
taxes paid, and $3729 in interest. (Tr. p 20). These items were awarded in Judge Morfitts 
judgment issued against Best of the Best Auto Sales Inc. Specifically the Judgment said: 
"And the COURT FINDS that the Plaintiff has been damaged as 
a result of these violations in the amount of $12,500 plus interest 
at the rate of 10.9% since June 8, 2007, in the amount of $3729 
and sales tax damage of $750" 
(R.Vol 1 p 29 Judgment - last paragraph) 
The original complaint filed in Hestead v Best of the Best Auto Sales Inc, and made a 
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part of the record by Western Surety, stated in Paragraph VI and XI 
"As a result of this breach, Plaintiff has been damaged in the 
amount of $12,500 in that the value of the vehicle is ½ of the 
value of an unbranded vehicle of good used quality plus 
a refund of sales tax in the amount of $750 plus interest 
Plaintiff paid on borrowed funds which he incurred in regard 
to the amount of $12,500 as proven at trial." 
(R.Vol IP 109 - Complaint Paragraph VI & XI) 
Neither Western Surety nor Best of the Best ever challenged this Judgment by post trial 
motions of any kind, or by any collateral challenge. There is no question that Western Surety 
has had notice after notice of this judgment, and knew about the litigation prior to judgment. 
The Judgment was not appealed. Therefore, the finding by Judge Morfitt that these two items 
are damages is binding and final. 
In any event the term "damage" includes this interest and sales tax damage. 
In Taylor v Neill 80 Idaho 90. at 94, 325 P.d 391 (1958) our Supreme Court stated 
that '"Damages' is a broad term and includes special as well as general damage." 
The amount of $750 is 6% of $12,500, and thus represents the amount of sales tax 
Nick Hestead was charged on money deceptively obtained by Best of the Best. Nick Hestead 
was in fact charged sales tax. (R.Vol 1 p 112 - "Tax Collected - $1500.00). Certainly, 
Hestead should not pay sales tax on an amount that he does not owe and which Judge Morfitt 
found he should never have paid. 
Hestead also financed the purchase of this truck with his credit union. (R.Vol 1 p 101 
- Dep Hestead P 12 L 10-11). In fact he will be paying on this loan until October 25, 2015. 
(R. Vol I p 104 Dep Hestead P 27 L 3-4) 
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The Idaho Court of Appeals has determined that loan interest can be a "damage" 
In Spreader Specialists v Monroe Inc 114 Idaho 15 at 21 752 P.2d 617 (1988) the Court said: 
"Idaho's appellate courts have never considered the precise 
question. Few courts have. However, the courts that have 
broached this topic seem to agree that amounts actually 
paid as interest on a loan obtained to remedy harm caused 
by wrongful conduct - such as breach of contract or tortious 
acts - are not prejudgment interest They are elements of 
consequential damages." (Cit om) 
Accordingly, we hold that interest charges incurred on a 
loan obtained in good faith, as part of a reasonable course 
of action to mitigate losses, may be recovered as an item 
of consequential damages. See generally Farmers Insurance 
Company of Arizona v R.B.L Investment Company 138 Ariz 
562,675 P.2d 1381 (Ct App 1983); Vining v Smith 213 Miss 
850, 58 So.2d 34 (1952) 
In our case, Nick Hestead borrowed money from his credit union to pay for the truck, 
and had to pay interest on the $12,500 value that he overpaid for the truck because of the 
misrepresentation by Best of the Best Auto Sales Inc. Hestead had no choice but to continue 
making payments on money that was taken from him by the deception of Best of the Best. His 
only alternative was to quit making payments, which would of course, result in a repossession. 
CONCLUSION 
The Judgment of the Trial Court should be affirmed except that the amount of the sales 
tax and the interest should be awarded as a matter of law. so that Nick Hestead should have 
a total judgment of $16,979.00. Nick Hestead should also be awarded his reasonable attorneys 
fees concerning this appeal. 
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